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Kathryn S. Ore 
 
  In Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Management, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained the correct application of the 
zone of interests test and further solidified the importance of proper NEPA and 
NHPA analysis in geothermal leasing. The court reaffirmed that the BLM and the 
Forest Service must conduct additional cultural and environmental analysis when 
granting lease extensions under the Geothermal Steam Act. Furthermore, it 
rejected the BLM’s decision to grant forty-year lease continuations to unproven 
geothermal leases by treating them as a unit rather than individually.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  
  In Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Management (“Pit River II”), the Pit 
River Tribe joined with several regional environmental organizations 
(collectively “Pit River”) to assert that the Bureau of Land Management’s 
(“BLM”) and the United States Forest Service’s (“USFS”) continuation of 
geothermal leases in the Medicine Lake Highlands violated the Geothermal 
Steam Act (“GSA”), the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the 
National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), and the Federal government’s 
fiduciary trust responsibility to American Indian tribes.1 The United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California rejected Pit River’s NEPA, 
NHPA, and fiduciary duty claims on the basis that the BLM lacked “discretion to 
consider environmental, historical, or cultural interests before continuing the 
leases.”2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded, concluding that Pit River’s claims were not limited to the GSA’s lease 
continuation clause.3 Instead, Pit River’s challenge implicated both the lease 
continuation provision and the lease extension provision.4 Since the lease 
extension provision requires the BLM to conduct additional review under NEPA 
and NHPA, the Ninth Circuit held that Pit River’s claim fell within the 
provision’s “zone of interests.”5  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
  Enacted in 1970, the GSA responded to growing national interest in the 
development of geothermal resources due to public concern about energy 
                                                     
1  Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 793 F.3d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 2015) 
[hereinafter Pit River II]; see Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-581, 84 Stat. 1566 
(Dec. 24, 1970) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1027 (2012)). 
2  Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1148-49; see 30 U.S.C. § 1005(a). 
3  Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1149. 
4  Id.; see 30 U.S.C. § 1005(g). 
5  Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1149. 
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shortages and environmental pollution.6 The GSA provides the framework for 
developing and using geothermal steam on federal lands.7 Under the GSA, when 
a geothermal lease produces geothermal steam or utilizes it in commercial 
quantities after the initial ten-year lease term, the Secretary of the Interior 
(“Secretary”) must grant a lease continuation for up to an additional forty-year 
term.8 If no geothermal steam is produced or utilized, the Secretary may choose 
to extend the lease for successive five-year terms under certain conditions.9 
These five-year lease extensions require additional NEPA and NHPA review to 
consider the potential cultural, historical, and environmental effects of the lease 
extension.10 The non-discretionary ten-year lease continuations do not require 
additional NEPA and NHPA review.11  
  Between 1982 and 1988, the BLM authorized geothermal development 
in the Medicine Lake Highlands of northeastern California, and granted the 
leases at issue in Pit River II.12 The BLM also entered into a “Unit Agreement,” 
which provided that drilling or operating on any tract of the leased land unit 
would be “accepted and deemed to be performed upon and for the benefit of each 
and every tract.”13 The BLM’s decision to authorize leasing followed the 
completion of a supplemental Environmental Assessment (“EA”) under NEPA.14  
  Geothermal development in the Medicine Lake Highlands conflicts with 
a number of tribal and non-tribal interests.15 The Pit River Tribe’s ancestral 
homeland includes the Medicine Lake Highlands.16 Members of the Tribe regard 
the area as sacred, and continue to use it “for a variety of spiritual and traditional 
cultural purposes that depend on the physical, environmental, and visual integrity 
of th[ose] areas, and their quietude.”17 Non-tribal individuals and environmental 
organizations also have recreational, aesthetic, scientific, and environmental 
interests in the area.18  
  After the initial ten-year leasing period, one of the leaseholders requested 
extensions for leases it owned in the Medicine Lake Highlands.19 The BLM 
internally disagreed on whether to grant a forty-year lease continuation for all the 
unproven leases as a unit, or to divide the unit and only grant the continuation to 
                                                     
  6  Robert B. Keiter, The Old Faithful Protection Act: Congress, National Park 
Ecosystems, and Private Property Rights 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 5, 9-10 (1993). 
  7  Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1149-50. 
  8  30 U.S.C. § 1005(a). 
  9  Id. § 1005(g). 
  10  Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 781-84 (9th Cir. 2006) 
[hereinafter Pit River I]. 
  11  Id. 
  12  Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1150–53. 
  13  Id. at 1150–51. 
  14  Id. at 1151. 
  15 Id. at 1149. 
  16  Id. 
  17  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
  18  Id. 
  19  Id. at 1151. 
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individual proven leases.20 Ultimately, in 1991, the BLM decided to grant a forty-
year lease continuation to the single proven lease, and five-year lease extensions 
to the remaining unproven leases.21 The leaseholder responded by requesting the 
BLM rescind its decision and grant a forty-year continuation under the Unit 
Agreement provisions.22 The BLM declined this request.23 Five years later, the 
leaseholder renewed its request and, in 1998, the BLM reversed its earlier 
decision and granted a forty-year continuation for the unproven leases as a unit.24 
At the time, the BLM did not explain why it changed its statutory interpretation 
of the GSA.25  
  In 2002, several of the plaintiffs in Pit River II filed a suit (“Pit River I”) 
that challenged a separate BLM decision.26 In Pit River I, the Ninth Circuit 
determined the GSA’s lease extension provision was discretionary because it 
provided that geothermal leases “may” be extended rather than “shall” be 
extended.27 Since the Ninth Circuit determined the decision to grant lease 
extensions was discretionary and the earlier considerations of the cultural and 
environmental impacts were inadequate, the BLM was required to conduct 
proper NEPA and NHPA review prior to extending the leases.28  
  While Pit River I was pending, the Pit River Tribe and Save Medicine 
Lake Coalition filed two separate suits challenging the BLM’s 1998 decision to 
grant the forty-year lease continuation.29 In 2012, the district court consolidated 
the two separate suits into Pit River II.30 Pit River agreed to file an amended 
complaint, and stipulated to limit its cause of action to the 1998 lease 
extensions.31 As a result, the district court concluded that Pit River had waived all 
of its GSA claims except the allegation that the BLM “unlawfully and 
retroactively continued the 26 leases . . . for an additional period of 40 years in 
May 1998 in absence of any commercial production.”32 Since the BLM does not 
have discretion to withhold a lease continuation if the requirements of the 
continuation provision are met, the district court determined that Pit River failed 
                                                     
  20 Id. 
  21  Id. 
  22 Id. 
  23  Id. at 1151–52. 
  24  Id. at 1152. 
  25  Id. 
  26  Id. at 1153. The BLM’s decision in Pit River I involved two leases located in a 
different unit than the leases at issue in Pit River II.  
  27 Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1153 (discussing Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 780). 
  28  Id. (discussing Pit River I, 469 F.3d at 788). 
  29  Id.; see Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 04-0956 (E.D. Cal. filed 
May 17, 2004); Save Medicine Lake Coal. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt. No. 04-0969 (E.D. Cal. 
filed May 18, 2004). 
30  Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1154. 
  31  Id. 
  32 Id. at 1157 (internal citations omitted). 
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to state a claim.33 The district court entered judgment for the BLM, and dismissed 
Pit River’s NEPA, NHPA, and fiduciary duty claims.34  
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
  Since the GSA does not provide for a private right of action, Pit River 
relied on the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to challenge the BLM’s 
decision to continue the unproven leases as a unit.35 To bring a cause of action 
under the APA, a plaintiff’s interests “must be arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute” at issue.36 Often 
characterized as a jurisdictional “prudential standing” requirement, the zone of 
interests test helps determine if “‘particular plaintiff[s] should be heard to 
complain of a particular agency decision.’”37 In applying the test, a court will 
specifically focus on “Congress’s intent ‘to make agency action presumptively 
reviewable.’”38  
  Last year, the Supreme Court of the United States “rejected the 
‘prudential standing’ label” and emphasized that the zone of interests test is not a 
jurisdictional analysis.39 The zone of interests test instead requires the court to 
use “‘traditional tools of statutory interpretation’” to establish whether a 
plaintiff’s claim falls within a “‘legislatively conferred cause of action.’”40 It only 
forecloses a suit “‘when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or 
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be 
assumed that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.’”41  
  In order to determine the “pivotal question” of whether Pit River’s 
claims fell within the GSA’s zone of interests, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
Congress’s purpose for enacting the GSA.42 Instead of looking at the GSA’s 
overall statutory scheme to decide if Congress “intended to create a cause of 
action encompassing Pit River’s claims,” the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis 
on the particular statutory provision.43 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held that Pit 
River’s ability to challenge the leases did not arise out of the GSA’s broad 
objectives, but rather from the GSA’s discretionary lease extension provision.44 
                                                     
  33 Id. 
  34  Id.  
  35  Id. at 1150. 
  36  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
  37  Id. at 1156 (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)). 
  38  Id. (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. 
Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012)) (internal citation omitted). 
  39  Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1377, 1387-88 (2014)). 
  40  Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387).  
  41  Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1389) (internal citations omitted). 
  42  Id. 
  43  Id. at 1156-57; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (“[T]he zone of interests 
test is to be determined not be reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question . . . but 
by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.” Id. at 175-76). 
  44  Pit River II, 793 F.3d at 1157. 
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  Focusing on the district court’s conclusion that Pit River had abandoned 
its challenge of the BLM’s interpretation of the GSA’s lease extension provision, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that Pit River clearly never limited its claims 
to only the lease continuation provision.45 The district court’s decision had relied 
heavily on its determination that Pit River’s claim was entirely based on the 
GSA’s lease continuation provision.46 Since GSA’s lease continuation provision 
was mandatory, it did not permit or require “consideration of environmental 
concerns or competing land uses.”47 As a result, the district court reasoned that 
Pit River’s suit was not within the zone of interests because the BLM lacked 
discretion to consider environmental, cultural, or historic factors in determining 
whether to grant lease continuations.48  
In reversing this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that Pit River had 
not abandoned its claim under the GSA lease extension provision and, therefore, 
the zone of interests test did not foreclose Pit River’s suit.49 This decision 
reinvigorated Pit River’s NEPA, NHPA, and fiduciary duty claims.50 The Ninth 
Circuit stated that if Pit River were to prevail on remand and the leases were 
determined eligible for only five-year lease extensions, the BLM would be 
“required to comply with NEPA and NHPA.”51 Compliance would involve 
additional consultation with the affected tribes, individuals, and environmental 
organizations.52  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
  Pit River II demonstrates the proper application of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s recent reinterpretation of the zone of interests test. Additionally, Pit 
River II reaffirms the Ninth Circuit’s earlier holding in Pit River I by confirming 
the requirement for additional NEPA and NHPA compliance under the GSA’s 
lease extension provision. As a result, geothermal leases previously granted 
without sufficient NEPA and NHPA analysis cannot be extended without 
additional consideration of environmental, historical, and cultural interests. Pit 
River II rejected the notion that geothermal lease units, comprised of individual 
leases, should be grouped together when deciding whether to grant a continuation 
or extension. According to the Ninth Circuit, the BLM must instead decide 
whether to grant a continuation or extension on a lease-by-lease basis. This 
holding ensures leaseholders cannot forego additional environmental, historical, 
and cultural review by contracting to have unproven leases granted long-term 
continuations just because they are located within a unit that contains a proven 
geothermal lease.  
                                                     
  45 Id. 
  46  Id. 
  47 Id. at 1155 (internal citations omitted). 
  48  Id. at 1157-58. 
  49  Id. 
  50  Id. at 1159. 
  51 Id. 
  52  Id. 
